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The interpretability logic ILF∗
Mladen Vukovic´†
Abstract.In this paper we determine a characteristic class of ILset-
frames for the principle F. Then we prove that the principle P is not
provable in the system ILF. We use a generalized Veltman model.
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Sazˇetak. Sistem ILF za logiku interpretabilnosti. U ovom
cˇlanku odredili smo karakteristicˇnu klasu ILskup-okvira za princip F.
Pomoc´u toga dokazujemo da princip P nije dokaziv u sistemu ILF. U
dokazu koristimo generalizirane Veltmanove modele.
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1. Introduction
The interpretability logic IL is the natural extension of provability logic. The lan-
guage of the interpretability logic contains propositional letters p0, p1, . . . , the
logical connectives ∧, ∨,→, ¬, and the unary modal operator 2 and the binary
modal operator .. We use ⊥ for false and > for true. The axioms of the inter-
pretability logic IL are:
(L0) all tautologies of the propositional calculus
(L1) 2(A→ B)→ (2A→ 2B)
(L2) 2A→ 22A
(L3) 2(2A→ A)→ 2A
(J1) 2(A→ B)→ (A . B)
(J2) (A . B ∧B . C)→ (A . C)
(J3) ((A . C) ∧ (B . C))→ ((A ∨B) . C)
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(J4) (A . B)→ (3A→ 3B)
(J5) 3A . A
where 3 stands for ¬2¬ and . has the same priority as → . The deduction rules of
IL are modus ponens and necessitation.
Various extensions of IL are obtained by adding some new axioms. These new
axioms are called the principles of interpretability. We observe here the principle
P : A . B → 2(A . B) (principle of persistence) and F : (A . 3A) → 2(¬A)
(Feferman’s principle).
In this paper we determine a characteristic class of ILset-frames for the principle
F. Then we prove independence of the principle P in the system ILF.
2. The Generalized Veltman semantic
Now we define the generalized Veltman semantic for the interpretability logic.
Definition 1. (de Jongh) An ordered triple (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}) is called the
ILset-frame, and denoted by W , if we have:
a) (W,R) is a L-frame, i.e. W is a non-empty set, and R is a transitive and
reverse well-founded relation on W (the elements of W we call nodes);
b) Every w ∈W satisfies
Sw ⊆W [w]× P(W [w])\{∅} ,
where W [w] denotes the set {x : wRx};
c) The relation Sw is quasi-reflexive for every w ∈W, i.e. wRx implies xSw{x};
d) The relation Sw is quasi-transitive for every w ∈ W, i.e. if xSwY and
(∀y ∈ Y )(ySwZy) then xSw(∪y∈Y Zy);
e) If wRuRv then uSw{v};
f) If xSwY and Y ⊆ Z ⊆W [w] then xSwZ.
Definition 2. (de Jongh) An ordered quadruple (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, `) is
called the ILset-model (generalized Veltman model), and denoted by W , if we have:
(1) (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}) is an ILset-frame;
(2) ` is the forcing relation between elements of W and formulas of IL, which
satisfies the following:
(2a) w `> and w 6 ` ⊥ are valid for every w ∈W ;
(2b) ` commutes with the Boolean connectives;
(2c) w `2A if and only if ∀x(wRx⇒ x `A);
(2d) w `A . B if and only if
∀v((wRv & v `A) ⇒ ∃V (vSwV & (∀x ∈ V )(x `B))).
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As usual we shall use the same letter W for a model and a frame. If W is an
ILset-frame and A is a formula of IL, we write W |= A iff w `A for all forcing
relations ` on W and all nodes w of W.
For a modal scheme (A) and an ILset-frame W , W |= (A) denotes the fact
thatW |= B for an arbitrary instance B of (A). Analogously, we defineW |= A and
W |= (A), ifW is an ILset-model. IfW is an ILset-model, V ⊆W and A a formula,
the notation V `A means that v `A for any v ∈ V.
It is easy to check the adequacy of the system IL with respect to ILset-models.
In [6] we proved the completeness of the system IL with respect to generalized
Veltman models.
Let Γ be a set of modal formulas. We will say that an ILset-frame W=(W,R,
{Sw : w ∈ W}) is in the characteristic class of Γ if we have W |= Γ, for all
forcing relations ` on W . The characteristic class of a principle of interpretability
is the characteristic class of the set of all instances of the principle. By (A)∗ we
denote a property of an ILset-frame which determines the characteristic class of
some principle A.
R. Verbrugge determined in [2] the characteristic classes of the principle P.
Denote by (P )∗ the following property of an ILset-frame :
x3Sx1Y & x1Rx2Rx3 ⇒ (∃Y ′ ⊆ Y )(x3Sx2Y ′).
3. The system ILF
S. Feferman proved the generalization of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem,
i.e. the formula Cons (which expresses the consistency of Peano arithmetic) is not
interpretable in PA. The Feferman’s principle F : (A .3A)→ 2(¬A) is a modal
description od Feferman’s theorem.
V. Sˇvejdar in [1] proved IL(KW1◦) ` F and ILW ` KW1◦. We proved in [7]
(Corollary 5.16) that ILW 6` P. 1 Sˇvejdar’s and our results imply ILF 6` P. In
Proposition 3 we will prove the same result more directly (without using Sˇvejdar’s
result).
V. Sˇvejdar determined a characteristic class of (ordinary) Veltman’s frames for
the principle F. His proofs of independences in system ILF are relatively com-
plicated. A problem is that principles F, W, KW1◦ have the same characteristic
classes. In [7] we proved that the principle F, W, KW1◦ have different characteristic
class of ILset-frames. So we have simpler proofs of independences than Sˇvejdar.
By the following definition we give relations which we use for the characteristic
class of ILset-frames for the principle F.
Definition 3. Let (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}) be ILset-frame and w ∈ W. We denote
with Sw and Rw the following relations:
1KW1 : (A . 3>) → (> . (¬A)), KW1◦ : ((A ∧ B) . 3A) → (A . (A ∧ (¬B))), W :
(A . B)→ (A . (B ∧ 2(¬A))).
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for ∅ 6= A ⊆W [w] and B ⊆ P(W [w])\{∅} is valid
ASwB ⇔ (∀a ∈ A)(∃B ∈ B)(aSwB);
for C ⊆ P(W [w])\{∅} and ∅ 6= D ⊆W [w] is valid
CRwD ⇔ (∀C ∈ C)(∀c ∈ C)(∃d ∈ D)(cRd) .
We denote by (F )∗ the following property of an ILset-frame:
relation Sw ◦Rw is reverse well-founded for all w ∈W.
Proposition 1. Let W be an ILset-frame. We have
W |= F if and only if W satisfies (F )∗
Proof. Let us suppose that the frame W does not have the property (F )∗, i.e.
there is a node w ∈ W such that relation Sw ◦ Rw is not reverse well-founded. So
there are sequences of sets A1 , A2 , . . . and B1 , B2 , . . . such that
A1 Sw B1 Rw A2 Sw B2 . . .
Now we define a forcing relation ` on W by:




We claim that w 6 `(p .3p)→ 2(¬p) . We have w 6 `2(¬p) , because wRa and
a ` p for all a ∈ A1. The claim w ` p .3p is equivalent to
∀x(wRx & x ` p ⇒ ∃Y (xSwY & (∀y ∈ Y )(∃z)(yRz & z ` p))).
Let x ∈ W is such that wRx and x ` p . By definition of the relation ` there
is i ∈ N such that x ∈ Ai . By definition of the relation Sw, and facts AiSwBi
and x ∈ Ai there is Y ∈ Bi such that xSwY . By BiRwAi+1 and Y ∈ Bi we
have (∀y ∈ Y )(∃z ∈ Ai+1)(yRz) . The fact z ∈ Ai+1 implies z ` p . So we proved
w ` p .3p.
Now, we prove that the condition (F )∗ is sufficient for the principle F. Let
ILset-frame W satisfy the condition (F )∗, and let ` be a forcing relation on W .
Let w ∈W be such that w `A .3A, i.e.
∀x((wRx & x `A) ⇒ ∃Y (xSwY & (∀y ∈ Y )(∃z)(yRz & z `A))) (∗)
Now we suppose that there is x1 ∈ W such that wRx1 and x1 `A. By (∗) there
is Y1 ⊆W [w] such that x1SwY1 and
(∀y ∈ Y1)(∃z(1)y )(yRz(1)y & z(1)y `A).
So the facts {x1}Sw{Y1} and {Y1}Rw{z(1)y : y ∈ Y1} are true. From this we have
{x1}(Sw ◦Rw){z(1)y : y ∈ Y1}.
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y `A. Then the fact (∗) implies that for
all y ∈ Y1 there is Y2,y ⊆W [w] such that z(1)y SwY2,y and
(∀u ∈ Y2,y)(∃z(2)y,u)(uRz(2)y,u) & z(2)y,u `A).
So we have
{Y2,y : y ∈ Y1}Rw{z(2)y,u : y ∈ Y1, u ∈ Y2,y}.
Also we proved
{x1}(Sw ◦Rw){z(1)y : y ∈ Y1}(Sw ◦Rw){z(2)y,u : y ∈ Y1, u ∈ Y2,y},
and
(∀y ∈ Y1)(∀u ∈ Y2,y)(z(2)y,u `A).
From this we conclude that the fact (∗) can be used again. Also, the last construc-
tion can be repeated infinitely many times. So the relation Sw ◦ Rw is not reverse
well-fonded, what is a contradiction. This means that w `2(−A), i.e. w `F. 2
Proposition 2. We have ILF 6` P.








Full arrows in the picture indicate the relation R, while the dotted ones indicate
Sw. The relations between nodes (transitivity of the relation R; wRvRu⇒ vSw{u};
quasi-reflexivity and quasi-transitivity of Sw; condition f) in the definition of ILset-
frame) will not be indicated by arrows.
In the picture we have wRvRb and bSw{a} but bSv{a} is not valid. So the
ILset-frame does not have the property (P )∗.
It is easy to see that Sx ◦Rx is reverse well-founded relation for all x ∈W. 2
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